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Have the negative economic consequences brought about by the ﬁnancial crisis made European
welfare states unaﬀordable? Iain Begg writes that while there is some validity to criticisms of
welfare spending, the welfare state performs a number of core functions that ensure it will continue
to be around for the foreseeable future. He also notes that European welfare states have shown a
greater capacity for change than is often recognised, with the shift toward a system that gives
priority to social investment making a real diﬀerence in several countries.
Many Europeans regard the establishment of the welfare state as one of the major achievements of
the 20th Century. Yet, in a time of stagnating economies and increasing strain on public ﬁnances, diﬃcult questions
are now being asked about whether welfare states have become too big, too resistant to change and, as a result,
too much of a drag on the economy. A phrase often repeated by Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, sums up
the diﬃculty: Europe, she claims, has seven percent of the world’s population, twenty-ﬁve percent of its GDP yet
accounts for as much as ﬁfty percent of the world’s social protection spending.
Her message is that this is unsustainable. Welfare states have to be funded by imposing taxes on workers and
companies, so that they make production more expensive in countries with generous welfare states. But this
ﬁnancing burden makes those workers more expensive to hire than their counterparts in emerging markets, while
the tax on companies can induce them to relocate to jurisdictions with more favourable tax regimes.
Some critics go further by arguing that the underlying reason for the crises aﬀecting so many European countries is
that public debt had been pushed upwards by the inexorable demands of the welfare state. The reasoning is that,
because politicians fear a backlash from voters if they try to cut welfare provisions, they are reluctant to impose cuts
on welfare budgets, and are also scared of raising taxes. Instead, they prefer to borrow ever increasing amounts,
leading to a steady increase in debt levels. When an economy is growing, this does not matter because a strong
economy means there is less demand for a number of welfare payments (such as unemployment beneﬁt) and tax
revenues are buoyant. Moreover, as long as GDP increases, the economy can ‘carry’ a higher debt level.
However, when there is a downturn, especially one as severe as that which hit several European countries in recent
years, governments have to meet existing obligations and face new demands on the welfare system arising directly
from the crisis. Certainly, in countries like Greece and Portugal, the increase in social distress is highly visible, but
even in countries facing less severe problems – Germany and the UK included – there has been a worsening of
social conditions. This leads directly to a budgetary crisis. The dilemma that governments then face is how to
achieve signiﬁcant reform of the welfare state at precisely the time when more people need its help.
Is the welfare state still worth having?
While there is some validity to these criticisms of European welfare states, they are also simply too crude to tell the
whole story. Welfare states in Europe fulﬁl three distinct functions and it is crucial to understand the balance
between these functions in assessing their sustainability and eﬀectiveness in dealing with social risks. The ﬁrst
function is to oﬀer an institutionalised means of savings for the population as a whole. Europeans have become
accustomed to the idea that they should be net contributors to the welfare system during their working lifetimes, but
then draw from the system in old-age through public pensions.
Second, the welfare system redistributes economic resources in various ways. An example would be tax systems
which take less (and sometimes even give money back – an issue that has been central to the UK renegotiation with
the EU) from poorer people and more from richer people. This redistributive function has been described as ‘Robin
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Hood’ after the famous historical character who took from the rich and gave to the poor. A related eﬀect is achieved
by public services which facilitate the sharing of risk between vulnerable people and secure people, a good example
being universal health care. If you are sick, no matter what your income is, you may face risks that you could not
aﬀord to cover on your own.
These ﬁrst two functions have in common that the
welfare state is only one of several ways of dealing
with the same challenges. The risk may fall purely on
the individual or, in some countries, the risk sharing
and the savings may be internalised within families.
This can work eﬀectively if families remain physically
close to each other and can spare resources to look
after older or inﬁrm family members. But in today’s
world in which labour mobility is increasingly
important, it is common for families to be much more
dispersed. They may still be able to share incomes,
but directly oﬀering care is much less practical.
It is the third function which is often least appreciated
by critics of European welfare states, namely
investing in the capacities of both individual people
and society as a whole. Basic education is a long-
standing role of the state, but in many European
countries, welfare states are now allocating a growing share of their budgets to various forms of social investment
that go well beyond educating children. An important motivation behind policies such as enhanced child-care or
increased opportunities for retraining or further education for adults is to ensure that the supply of labour is
increased.
The social investment function of the welfare state helps to explain the apparent paradox that some of the countries
in Europe which spend the most (as a proportion of gross domestic product) on welfare are also frequently placed
highest in international league tables of competitiveness, such as those produced by the World Economic Forum. By
investing in the workforce, countries like Sweden and Denmark are able to boost the human capital of their
populations. As a result, the cost of welfare policies does not undermine competitiveness as much as might be
expected, because it is oﬀset by higher productivity and employability of workers. In this sense, the welfare state is
a productive factor rather than something which damages the economy.
Nevertheless, the balance matters. Some countries, especially in southern Europe, created generous pension
systems and then found that they were becoming unaﬀordable. As the number of pensioners rose relative to the size
of the working age population, it became increasingly diﬃcult to fund the agreed payments. It is a problem that will
strike all countries subject to rapid ageing, including China where the long-term consequences of the one-child
policy will have a dramatic eﬀect on the balance between young and old.
The solutions to this problem are analytically quite straightforward: raise the pension age, reduce the generosity of
payments or ﬁnd alternative sources of revenue, for example by raising taxes or using the returns from a sovereign
wealth fund invested abroad. However, the experience of many European countries has also shown that making
change is politically very tricky. Pensioners are more likely to vote in elections and, not surprisingly, they will tend to
support political parties that oﬀer them better terms. As the proportion of pensioners in the population grows, so too
does their political inﬂuence and this is where the reluctance of governments to make unpopular decisions can have
damaging eﬀects on public ﬁnances. Many European governments have reason to fear the power of the ‘grey’ voter.
On an optimistic note, European welfare states have shown a greater capacity for change than is sometimes
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realised. The debt problem is real, but across the continent, the shift towards a system that gives priority to social
investment is making a real diﬀerence. In spite of everything, and Chancellor Merkel’s concerns, they will be around
for the foreseeable future.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article originally appeared at the People’s Daily. It gives the views of the author, and not the position of
EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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